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Abstract		
 
In this project we are shedding light on the question of the legitimacy in the Security 
Council of the United Nations (UNSC). To do this we have chosen three different 
states that are all permanent members of the UNSC, and these are the United States, 
China and Russia. Before we can examine the legitimacy, there has to be a clear 
definition of legitimacy, which in this project is Ian Hurd’s theory of legitimacy. 
There are different factors that are implemented, which is internalization, symbolic 
value and self-interest. By analyzing different statements, speeches and other official 
documents from the three different states, we have been able to elaborate on these 
factors. In this project, the focus has been on the intervention in Libya, as it is a 
concrete example where an intervention occurred, which have been a result of the 
new principle of humanitarian intervention called “Responsibility to Protect”(R2P). 
Furthermore the view of legitimacy by the states changes, from when it is a proposal, 
to the actual actions implemented by the UNSC. To provide a broader knowledge we 
have examined statements that appeared before the intervention in Libya happened, 
and also statements after the intervention. This helped us to get an understanding of 
how the different factors are influencing the perception of legitimacy.  When the 
analysis has been done, it can be concluded that all three factors have a major role in 
order to answer whether or not the UNSC are legitimate or not. Furthermore, that all 
states in the UNSC is affected of the internalization and therefore all entails the 
symbolic value and self-interest.  		
 
 
Keywords: The United Nation (UN), the Security Council of the United Nations 
(UNSC), legitimacy, internalization, symbolic, states, Russia, China, the United 
States(US), R2P, humanitarian intervention. 
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Chapter	1:	Introduction		
This project revolves around the Security Council of the United Nations, and its five 
permanent members, whereas we have chosen to focus on three of them. These are 
China, the United States (US) and Russia and how they view legitimacy, specifically 
when it comes to humanitarian intervention with implementation of “The 
Responsibility to Protect” (R2P). 
The UN is one of the most recognized, and powerful international organizations in 
World society and its power reach beyond borders, when it comes to natural disasters, 
famine and our focus; crimes against humanity. All actions taken in relation to 
protecting humanity (human citizens in a given country), are controlled by the 
Security Council, within the principle of R2P.      
The UN Security Council (UNSC) is an international organ within the construction of 
the UN.  
All members of the UN, including the permanent members of the UNSC, have signed 
the UN Charter, and therefore, they have agreed “to maintain international peace and 
security, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of 
threats to the peace… in conformity with the principles of justice and international 
law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead 
to a breach of the peace” (Icj-cij.org, 2015). The setup, and the construction, of the 
Council are often questioned by scholars and political actors, since it has fifteen 
members that changes every second year, and five permanent members that never 
change. These five permanent members have the power to exercise a right to veto any 
proposition, meaning that the UNSC cannot pass anything, react or initiate action, if 
so much as one permanent members uses its veto right. These veto rights are eligible 
for usage on several topics such as questions about humanitarian intervention e.g. 
R2P. 
 
The “Responsibility To Protect” is a tool made for humanitarian intervention, and it 
was meant as a new chapter in the history of UN humanitarian intervention, Kofi 
Anan, the Secretary General of the UN, from 1997 until 2006, stated that “Over the 
years, international laws and institutions have been developed to promote and protect 
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human rights and to prohibit, prevent and punish the worst international crimes. State 
sovereignty is no longer an absolute shield behind which governments may hide to do 
what they please” (Annan, 2012). It was introduced in 2001, but it first became a part 
in the UN charter in 2005. The initial reasoning for the creation of R2P, was due to 
the fact that humanitarian intervention before R2P could not involve military force, 
and also mostly because of the atrocities that happened in Rwanda and Srebrenica 
during the 1990’s. This resulted in the concept of humanitarian intervention to suffer 
from a problem of legitimacy (O’Shea 2012: 174-175). 
In both instances the international society, including peacekeeping UN troops in the 
Balkans, were unable to stop the humanitarian crimes that was committed. Because of 
this the international society, and the UN, wanted to engineer something that would 
make a reoccurrence of this impossible, and then created R2P as a resolution.   
 
When it comes to the implementation of R2P, one of the main keys to understanding 
how and why it is used, can be discovered if you look at what the actors’ view as 
legitimate action and intervention. When is military intervention legitimate, and what 
kind of military action can be deemed legitimate? How can one define the concept of 
legitimacy, and how is it even constructed? Different scholars have a wide array of 
approaches on how to define legitimacy, and many different actors have various 
views on what should then be conceived as being legitimate, thus making it difficult 
to find one common understanding of legitimacy. 
We chose to define how legitimacy is constructed in line with the definition shared by 
scholar Ian Hurd. Then one must ask the obvious question; How should you analyze 
something in order to reveal anything about legitimacy? We will look at the veto 
practices after the inclusion of R2P, and then we will interpret how the three 
permanent members talk about legitimacy in that same period, to shed light on to 
what extend they share the same view on legitimacy.  
The reason we chose to focus on the UNSC in relations to the act of the 
“Responsibility To Protect”, was first and foremost based on the conflicting views 
and interest of the three permanent member states in the UNSC, Russia, China and the 
US. Based on some interesting findings, correlating to the permanent members veto 
practices, we then decided to look into the issues connected to the UNSC and its 
actors’ view on legitimacy. This becomes evident when looking at the inconsistent 
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use of veto rights and humanitarian interventions in relation to R2P. When looking at 
the history of when the permanent members use their veto rights, it seems as if certain 
interests, or different views, on behalf of the permanent members sometimes override 
the question about humanitarian intervention. Since the construction of UN and its 
Security Council in 1945, the permanent members have exercised their veto powers 
on a plethora of occasions. E.g. in the Cold War, countries like the Soviet Union (now 
Russia) and the US sometimes used their veto powers when questions about action, 
such as humanitarian intervention, if it conflicted with their beliefs, connections or 
interests, within the country that the intervention would happen in. This is evident 
when looking at which cases the USSR and the US exercised their rights to veto. 
From the start of the 2000’s both France and England have chosen not to use veto 
rights, and therefore we find it most relevant to look at the countries that have. Since 
the implementation of R2P into the UN Charter in 2005,  Russia, the US, and China 
have often exercised their veto rights when it comes to questions of humanitarian 
intervention involving military force, in line with R2P(Research.un.org,2015). The 
only case where a majority of votes were reached, and none of the permanent 
members used veto rights was in 2009 in Libya. Even though the election process was 
more complicated than a clear yes, since some permanent members abstained from 
voting, one could make the argument that none of the permanent members thought 
humanitarian intervention involving military force, was illegitimate in this instance. 
While the perception of a legitimate intervention changed for some members, it is 
very interesting to look at how, and in what terms, the different officials talked about 
the operation in Libya.  
But why is this? Could it be because of different perceptions on what they view as 
legitimate? In this context, this project tries to answer how the UNSC is losing their 
legitimacy, in the eyes of international actors, hereby the states in the UNSC, because 
of the inability to agree on certain topics related to humanitarian intervention. 
Problem	Area	
 
This project will examine the difficulties that the UNSC had when implementing R2P, 
in relation to the Libyan intervention, with keeping their legitimacy. To understand 
legitimacy and to answer whether or not the UNSC is legitimate, we need to find one 
definition of legitimacy and work from that definition. We have chosen to focus on 
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Ian Hurd’s view of legitimacy in international society and by working with only one 
definition, we can then analyze whether the UNSC’s actions upholds this definition 
and how the five permanent states contributes to their own integral and the overall 
legitimacy of the UNSC.   
Furthermore, our focus will be how the five permanent states change their view in 
relation to the UNSC’s use of R2P. This can be done through analyzing an example 
where R2P has been used, but has caused a lot of questioning towards the UNSC and 
their legitimacy. The example we are going to use is Libya. We will focus on Hurd’s 
theory and how he explains that legitimacy is constructed through a process of 
internalization. Even though legitimacy can be structured within a socially 
constructed reality, it can just as easily be constructed within an international 
organization (IOs), as if the IOs, here the UNSC.  
In relation to Hurd’s theory on legitimacy, we will analyze comments made by 
official state representatives, in regards to the concept of legitimacy. We have chosen 
to focus on the five permanent states as one unit, but then go deeper in the analysis 
with the United States, Russia and China. We have discovered that these countries are 
those with the most different views, and they are often those who come out first with 
statements about the UNSC and questioning their legitimacy. These countries are also 
the most interesting to analyze when we focus on Libya as our example on how R2P 
has been used.  
Problem	formulation		
Did the United States of America, China and Russia share the same views on the 
legitimacy of the humanitarian intervention in Libya authorized by the Security 
Council of the United Nations?  
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Chapter	2:	Methods	and	Theory	
	
Methods	
“Method refers to the choice of a body of empirical material it to be examined. 
Methodology consists in the explication of that choice - in formal terms, the 
justification of the hypothetical proposition - and the process for dealing with it, 
along with a determination of what would constitute proof.” (Navari, 2009: 2) 
 
In order to answer our research question about the legitimacy in the UNSC, we have 
to look at the state actors changing agenda and perception of legitimacy. To answer 
this question we need to grasp what legitimacy is and how the actors within the 
UNSC perceive it. In order to do this, we therefore need a theoretical framework to 
work from. We have chosen to work with Ian Hurd’s definition of legitimacy. He 
presents us with different aspects within legitimacy and we will examine these 
aspects. He does this by giving a description of what internalization is, and then 
explains the definition of legitimacy. When we explain legitimacy, we focus on 
international organizations, as we define the UN as one. Conjointly, we will explain 
symbolic values and the validity of the system in the international community, which 
is relevant to understand how both legitimacy and an international organization can 
even exist. Also, we will focus on explaining the UN, the UNSC and R2P in relation 
to the theoretical framework.   
We also focus on the different perception on legitimacy, and how this has an impact 
on the use of R2P and humanitarian interventions. If we can get an understanding on 
the use of R2P is reliant on how legitimacy is being understood, we can get an 
understanding of why R2P has been used in the case of Libya. To answer these 
inquiries and our research question, our project first examines a specific case, where 
R2P has been used.  
Before finding a relevant theory, we did research according to our topic, after we 
found the theory, we chose to let the theoretical framework shape the direction of our 
research.  
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Throughout our project, we have been using an inductive research style, which is 
associated with interpretivism. We observed the discussion of whether the 
intervention process of the UN was seen as legitimate, and then we proceeded to 
observe the state actors’ statements to see whether these actors represented a positive 
or negative perception of the humanitarian intervention in Libya and the UN. 
Afterwards we found a theory, which stated a definition of legitimacy and what role 
international organizations have to play in the international community. With this 
definition we were able to deduce whether these state actors had a similar perception 
of legitimacy and their self-interest according to it (Gray, 2004).   
 
To get an understanding of the topic, we start with some background information 
about the UN, the UNSC, R2P and the situation in Libya leading up to the 
intervention. This information is essential for the reader to be able to understand the 
context of our analysis. Afterwards we analyze the different perceptions of legitimacy 
that the states in UNSC have. Since this project revolves around the US, Russia and 
China, we look at the strategies and statements from all of these states, with the 
purpose of getting an understanding of whether they agree, or disagree, on the 
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention regarding R2P, and the intervention in Libya. 
Also, to analyze legitimacy and to measure it we focus on the legitimacy of 
humanitarian intervention in Libya. Throughout the analysis, we use the humanitarian 
intervention in Libya as a case to analyze the different states perception of legitimacy.  
The empirical data used in this project comes from both primary and secondary 
sources. The sources we use in the project consist of: official UN documents, press 
releases, books, newspaper articles, websites, reports, academic journals, resolutions, 
official documents and statements from national delegations, statistical material and 
government publications. The aim of this project is to answer the research question by 
analyzing the empirical data to get an understanding of how the US, Russia and China 
view legitimacy, and if the intervention in Libya was legitimate, according to the 
different states. 
As stated before, the empirical data comes from both primary and secondary sources, 
this data showed China, Russia and the US varying perception of legitimacy. We 
analyze the primary data we collect and use as evidence, and the secondary data to 
support our arguments.  
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First of all we use reliable primary sources, this is shown by the several UN 
documents; among these are official records from a UNSC meeting taken place in 
March 2011. This kind of sources is first hand, and has not been analyzed in any way 
or edited by any author. It consists of speeches from every member state 
representative in the UNSC. This is relevant to our project, because this gives us a 
first hand impression, of how the US, Russia and China act in an international arena, 
and also gives an insight in the three states foreign affairs through the statements that 
they give. Speeches made by several state representatives, make this source reliable, 
also in the consideration that they are being considered experts on their own national 
interests. This combined with the fact that the UN is perceived as a trustworthy and 
recognized organization, also makes it relevant to our project and credible to base our 
work on. Furthermore, we use this first hand data to analyze these three states’ 
behavior and relations in the international community of the UN, and look at the 
difference of these in between.   
Multiple sources requires thinking at a critical analytical level, consequently we use 
press releases and statements released by the government agencies. Coming directly 
from a state agency makes it a primary source, because when speaking on behalf of a 
state government, one would expect that this make the source reliable in representing 
the interests of the state. This is essential to our project, because we found numerous 
leaders and representatives with expected credibility that reaches consensus, and then 
our data becomes evidence, which is crucial to back our claims in the project. 
We operate with many different types of secondary sources in the project.  As an 
example, we use academic sources in our project. These academic sources come from 
several reports and journals. Academic sources are more reliable than other secondary 
sources, because of the peer-review process. A notable issue with secondary sources 
is, that data can be interpreted in different ways, and therefore some critical viewing 
of the source always necessary.  
 
When secondary sources is used to present the same data, it then makes it a reliable 
source, due to the fact that they are reaching the same conclusion, with separate data. 
This makes them relevant to our project, since it helps us shape the factuality of the 
case study information leading up to our primary data. 
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In our project we have used Ian Hurd’s book, “After Anarchy”, for our theory. This 
kind of source is secondary, which is given by the fact that Ian Hurd is using primary 
data, such as those we have previously stated.  This source is also reliable, because 
books are most of the time validated, and most of all often written by people with 
some kind of insight in their respective fields. 
We have used a variety of articles, because no article can provide a full 
contextualization of a situation, especially when it comes to a full-fledged 
humanitarian intervention.  
We have been using news articles as a simplifier and secondary source, for the use of 
information. We are aware that news articles may change its context over time. This 
type of source can be one-sided source, since it is based on articles made by a single 
author. But we include this kind of sources since it helps our project shape the context 
of the matter. The important thing to note when using newspaper articles is if the 
publisher has writing these articles are reliable and legitimate. For example, we refer 
to The Guardian, The Economist and BBC, these news agencies are some of the most 
recognizable in the world, and the journalists writing the different articles ought to be 
objective and critical to their sources, which should make them more reliable to our 
work. The reason for that most of our data from newspaper articles are from 
“Western” news companies is because the language barrier, due to the lack of 
understanding Russian and Chinese among the group members.  
Throughout the project, we have used different academic journals, to give us an 
insight in e.g. R2P and the intervention in Libya. Academic journals are peer-
reviewed, which makes it a reliable source to back up our arguments, and to reflect on 
our discussion that has been occurring throughout the project. 
 
The analysis will start by looking at the UN and UNSC, how they act as an 
international organization, what role they have and what Ban Ki-moon stated on the 
matter of Libya. Then there will be an analysis on the different states actions in this 
matter, what representatives of the states claimed and which self-interest they had on 
the humanitarian intervention in Libya, as a part of these countries foreign affairs. In 
the analysis of the perception from the different states, we used different sources to 
get their perception on the humanitarian intervention in Libya and the legitimacy in it, 
which we used in our arguments. From Russia and China’s perception we have used 
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sources from their embassies and press releases from their respective national 
delegations. This gave us a legitimate perception, which we could not get from news 
articles, because it comes directly from the politicians and it has not been twisted or 
misinterpreted, which in most cases would have been the occasion if it came from 
news articles or other secondary sources. However, secondary sources did back up the 
arguments, but was not used as the main arguments. From the US’ perception we used 
statements from President Obama, Secretary Hillary Clinton and the US ambassador 
to the UN from 2009-2013 Susan Rice, whom all had a direct say on the matter of the 
humanitarian intervention in Libya.      
A discussion also takes place throughout the analysis, which focuses on if the states 
see the UN and the humanitarian intervention in Libya as legitimate, and if the UNSC 
is the best way to solve humanitarian crisis like the situation in Libya.  
Theory		
Internalization		
Before we can see if something is legitimate, Hurd argues that it first has to be 
internalized. He states that internalization has occurs when two factors are involved. 
These two factors are when an actor either feels fear from not being a part of 
something; this fear is related to a punishment from the actor that enforces the rules. 
Furthermore, when there is this form of fear, or coercion, then it creates an 
asymmetric relationship between the actors, as there will be a ‘powerful’ actor who 
will have more control over the ‘weaker’ actor. Hurd argues: “if a social system relies 
at base on coercion to motivate compliance with its rules, we would expect to see 
enormous resources devoted to enforcement and surveillance and low levels of 
compliance when the enforcing agent it not looking” (Hurd, 1999: 383-384).  When 
Hurd talks about internalization and coercion he states that it is very important to be 
clear about the fact that coercion is a very simple form to have control, furthermore it 
only has one pole in the mechanism of social control.  
The second aspect of internalization is the self-interest. This is where the states can 
see an interest in obeying to these rules, norms or values presented to them. If an actor 
in the social society can see these advantages, then it will be easier to make the actor 
to obey from this centered power. It will then not be coercion, but a more naturally 
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and more obvious obeytion. It is then a larger motivation for the actor and will 
provide a better opportunity to promote its own interest (Hurd, 1999). When there is a 
self-interest, then it appears that actors are willing to do more and go further, if there 
was no self-interest, because the actor can now see their goals to be achieved in ways 
it could not before (Hurd, 2007: 37). If we compare the coercion and the self-interest, 
these two aspects have one thing in common; “When an actor is presented with a 
situation of choice that involves threats of reprisals or where the available choices 
have been manipulated by others, the self-interest and coercion models will follow the 
same logic and predict the same outcome.”(Hurd, 2007: 38)   
In an international society the actors in it, especially the institutions will provide 
symbols to influence the participation of the actors, but also their belief. If symbols 
become a factor in the social international society, then it can affect whether or not an 
institution will be seen as legitimate. With this symbolic politics it is important to 
focus on the different states’ self-interests, and how the symbols affect them. Kertzer 
says: “At its root, politics is symbolic, because both the formation of human 
groupings and the hierarchies that spring from them depend on symbolic activity.” 
(Hurd, 2007: 50). Holding a certain position in an IO can give the state symbolic 
power; this in-turn gives more legitimacy to the IO’s, but will also provide benefits 
for the states’ self-interest.  
To sum up, when we talk about internalization it is a mechanism in a social context. It 
is created in two different ways, but in the end, the thoughts of the actors in it, will 
have the same thought. It will either if it is in relation to coercive or in relation to self-
interest, influence the thoughts with the actor who will focus on the benefits. Then it 
can either be the benefits from not being punished, or it could be symbolic or other 
goods that will benefit the actor. Both things will influence the power of the 
organization, which will give the organization way more power than else.  
      
Legitimacy	
In this project our main focus is legitimacy and how this is incorporated in both the 
actors and the institution of international society. Hurd argues, “legitimacy refers to 
the belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed”(Hurd, 2007: 30). 
With this perception of legitimacy we will clarify what factors that are relevant to 
focus on. Before something can be legitimate, there must be actors who think the rule 
Rasmus	Jacobsen,	Victor	Kenting,		 Group	20	 The	21st	of	December	Ditlev	Herzland,	Hakan	Eroglu,		Rasmus	Hviid	and	Maria	Christiansen	
	 14	
or norm is ‘right’ or ‘moral’. These actors will then share the same beliefs, which will 
make the proposal legitimate. It is then not influenced by coercion or self-interest, but 
will be influenced by the actor's belief and sense of rightness and obligation (Hurd, 
2007: 30). When this is being argued then legitimacy can be the explanation of an 
individual actor or it can be an element in a dominant behavior, with a strategy used 
by leaders. Before legitimacy can occur internalization must happen. But as argued 
before internalization can only take place if an actor’s behavior is influenced by some 
forces outside itself (Hurd, 2007: 31).  
In relation to our focus in this project it is essential to mention that: “Perceptions of 
legitimacy may be quite different for different individuals, even if the individuals are 
subject to the same forces of socialization, such as occurs among siblings”(Hurd, 
2007: 31).  With his definition then legitimacy will have influence on the changes of 
interests and it will change it more systematically to support the norms (Hurd, 2007: 
45). Furthermore the definition contributes to help structuring the decision situation. 
Then both the interest and the payoff for the actor become essential.  
To sum up, legitimacy is very much depending on the internalization and how the 
actors in the social society behave. It is essential to mention, that legitimacy cannot 
exist without the actors in the socially constructed society believe that the rules or 
norms set by an institution or actor are legitimate. If then the actors share the same 
belief, then it may not be an enforcement, but the belief of what is right and what is 
not.  
 
International	Organizations		
Ian Hurd works with Max Weber’s discussion about how legitimacy affects the 
structure of the society, and how the structures are influenced by the shared beliefs. 
When Weber talks about this structure, he calls it ‘validity’ and this refers to the fact 
that an action in society will be guided by either a legitimated rule or an institution. In 
this section our focus will be the institution, rather than a rule. We will focus on the 
rules within the UN, as that is our international organization. By using Weber’s 
‘validity’ Hurd argues that it is “[...] useful in thinking about the international system 
because it identifies a structural consequence of the individual-level process of 
internalization. When that process is widely shared at the individual level, it affects 
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the structure of the system overall by shaping the expectations for all actors about 
what constitutes a normal pattern of behavior.”(Hurd, 2007: 45).  
This also contributes to how the effects of validity on the behavior of the individual is 
reflected in both the shared beliefs and also how these beliefs can help changing the 
strategic settings of decisions for all actors, and not only those who share the same 
belief. This means that all who are participating in the international organization are 
affected from the changes in the organization. When an international system is valid it 
produces a structure of limits and it then encourage all actors to be in the system as an 
objective reality (Hurd, 2007: 46). When looking at a valid social system, it is not 
enough to have only one institution, but it could create some structure in its area of 
competence and, furthermore, it will be seen as an authority (Hurd, 2007: 47).   
To sum up, an international organization or institution will be created by actors. These 
actors will also influence the power that the institution will have. Before an 
international institution can be a reality there must be a valid social system. The 
system has an affect on the actors in it, but the actors will also affect the system.  
 
 
Chapter	3:	Clarification	of	the	United	Nations			
The	UN,	The	UN	Security	Council	and	R2P		
The	United	Nations:		
The United Nations was founded in 1945 after the Second World War by 51 
countries, with the goal of keeping the world secure and in peace, and to do so by 
peaceful means. It was also a mean to develop friendly relations and learning to solve 
international problems with respect to race, sex, language and religion. 
Ever since the foundation of the UN it has grown, to essentially 193 members, who all 
have their own specific task within the UN organs and committees. 
The principles and purposes of the UN is descripted in the Charter of the United 
Nation Chapter I: 
1.     To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the 
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about 
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by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international 
law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead 
to a breach of the peace; 
2.     To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace; 
3.     To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and 
4.     To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these 
common ends. 
(Un.org, 2015) 
 
Within the UN there are different organs. We have chosen to focus on the executive 
agent, which is the UNSC. This is done due to the fact in order to answer the question 
about the intervention in Libya, we have to look at questions about the legitimacy of 
the executive agent in the UN.  
The	Security	Council	
The UN emphasizes the importance of their own role by stating that the Security 
Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. The UNSC leads in determining the existence of threats against peace and 
human rights, and may meet whenever peace is being threatened. 
The UNSC consists of 15 members. There is the five permanent members; the 
federation of Russia, The United states of America, The Republic of China, France 
and Great Britain. Furthermore, there are 10 countries elected every 2 years. All 
members have one vote, but the five permanents are equipped with the right to veto.   
It has been accepted by all members of the UNSC to carry out the decisions of the 
UNSC. 
There are three stages of how the UNSC reacts to a threat. First of all, when a 
concerning threat has been detected, the UNSC first action is to find an agreement by 
peaceful means, which can involve an investigation, or a settlement of the dispute by 
the Secretary-General. 
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If the dispute then leads to hostilities, the primary concern is to bring it to an end by 
ceasefire directives to prevent an escalation or to dispatch a military peacekeeping 
force to help reduce tensions. (Un.org, 2015) 
If not maintaining peace and security by these measures, the last resort of 
enforcement measures are sanctions, cutting diplomatic relations, blockades or 
collective military actions. By doing this the UN has created a principle to 
accommodate the peace and security. This is called the “Responsibility to Protect”.  
 
Responsibility	to	Protect	
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a principle, where states and leaders have the 
collective responsibility to protect civilians against genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. The responsibility from the international 
community is to protect the civilians through R2P, which was established in the UN 
in 2005, at the World Summit. The principle is build from three core pillars: 
1. The state carries the primary responsibility for the protection its citizens from 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. 
2. The international community has a responsibility to assist the states in fulfilling its 
responsibility to protect its citizens. 
3. The international community should use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and 
other peaceful means to protect civilians from these crimes. If a state fails to protect 
its citizens or is in fact the perpetrator of crimes, the international community must be 
prepared to take more radical measures, including the collective use of force through 
the UN Security Council (Responsibilitytoprotect.org, 2015). 
It was genocides like the one in Rwanda, that was a crucial motivator to establish 
R2P. The international community was spectators to a horrible incident, where no 
guidelines on how to interfere in a sovereign state were available. Rwanda did not 
protect its own civilians therefore did not live up to its responsibility to protect its 
civilians, which was then passed on to the international community (Un.org, 2015). 
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) develop 
a string of interventions in 2001, where the goal has been responsibility – to protect 
people at grave risk. 
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ICISS developed three responsibilities; they made the Responsibility to Protect 
Charter:  
1.  To prevent conflicts 
2.  To react in extreme cases military 
3.  To rebuild particularly after military intervention 
To sum up in the UN there is the executive agent, which is the UNSC. By deciding 
how to keep World peace, there has been made a principle called R2P, which is made 
to prevent crimes against humanity, by implementing R2P in humanitarian 
interventions.  
Chapter	4:	Legitimacy	of	the	UNSC				
This chapter will include an examination of the UNSC and the US, Russia and China. 
It will focus on legitimacy and how it is being interpreted within the actions in 
relation to the intervention in Libya, with regard to the states. First we will give an 
overview over the voting process and how it has changed over time. Then we will 
look at the historical aspect of the intervention in Libya, and why there was a need for 
one. After these two sections, we will analyze the UNSC, although we do not focus 
on the UN as an organization as a whole, but on how the different states view 
legitimacy in relation to the UNSC and their actions. In order to explain the UNSC, a 
brief explanation of the structure of the UN and the Security Council is needed. 
Additionally, to get an understanding of the different states’ view on legitimacy, we 
must define what legitimacy is. We have chosen to use Ian Hurd’s constructivist and 
rationalistic view on international organizations, and we are using his theory of 
legitimacy. We will use this one definition of legitimacy and analyze how states’ 
perception of legitimacy, goes along with how they act in the UNSC. 
With usage of Ian Hurd’s theory several factors need to be elaborated.  We have to 
understand the concept internalization, as Hurd argues, "internalization is the process 
by which an individual apprehends an "objective” reality and endows it with meaning 
shared by others” (Hurd, 2007: 41). Furthermore he argues that legitimacy is a 
process, which comes from internalization. With his definition of internalization, we 
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can use this in relation to our focus on the UNSC, whereas states come together and 
create their perceived idea of how reality should be portrayed. Therefore it creates a 
principle such as R2P, to increase the opportunities to achieve the common goals of 
the states. When the process of legitimacy is operative, the actors are influenced by 
internalization. This can be seen when an actor’s interest or sense of it, is affected by 
outside forces. This is most definitely seen in the way they approach rules, norms, 
laws and such as in an international community (Hurd, 2007: 31). When we look at 
legitimacy as a process of internalization, it corporates well with how the UN was 
founded in the first place, and on which basis it was founded. 
The journal ”the legitimacy of the UNSC - Evidence from general assembly debates” 
by Martin Binder and Monika Heupe, also focuses on legitimacy in relation to the 
UNSC. The theory that they have used revolves around the concepts; legal legitimacy, 
procedural legitimacy, and performance legitimacy. The methods they use are very 
similar to ours, since they use “decoded evaluative statements” by UN member state 
representatives, in order to shed light on their  perceptions of the Council’s legitimacy 
(Binder and Heupel, 2014). They used a qualitative data analysis program called 
“Atlas.ti” to decode evaluative statements made by UN members in the General 
Assembly, by assigning indicators to the three aspects of legitimacy mentioned 
before. The indicators were coded so that they could show when member states had 
either positive or negative views on the UNSC legitimacy, in relations to the three 
different types of legitimacy. Although we only focus on one theory, our methods are 
very similar to those used by Binder and Heupe, since we both try to decode 
statement made by members, by using several definitions  of legitimacy, and then 
interpreting, if the states deem the UNSC and their actions as legitimate (Binder and 
Heupel, 2014). 
Some problems arise with using words deemed to have positive or negative 
connotations, although they base them on statements by member states about articles 
in the UN Charter, it still is very difficult, if not impossible to not suffer from some 
kind of bias, as what is negative and positive depend on how it is interpreted. Also, 
another obvious problem is that it is hard to solidify if the statements shared by the 
officials reflects their actual meaning. (Binder and Heupel, 2014). 
To sum up, even though their methods are similar, there are still some differences. As 
we analyze the exact statements regarding the intervention in Libya, and how the 
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states’ perception is in relation to the legitimacy of the UNSC. We do not decode the 
words they are saying in general statements regarding the UNSC and we do not 
analyze the hidden meaning of using biased language. 
 
Voting	process	and	the	power	of	the	UNSC		
This section will contain a brief overview of what powers the Council retain, and how 
its decision making process is structured. 
According to article 24 of the UN Charter; “the Council acts on behalf of all member 
states and its decisions are binding on all member states and to some extent, non-
members” (Fischer, 2009: 5). 
In everyday practice the UNSC has the powers to make recommendations to disputing 
parties and the General Assembly, while also being able to make binding decisions on 
behalf of all member states (Fischer, 2009: 5). 
  
Even though the five permanent members have the aforementioned right to veto, they 
dictate everything in regards to the decision making process. This becomes evident 
when looking at Chapter VII of the UNSC. According to article 27, procedural 
matters require what is called an affirmative vote of at least nine members. This 
means that any nine of the total 15 members have to vote in favor in order for the 
proposal to be passed. Secondly all other decisions “shall be made by an affirmative 
vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members”.  
(Un.org, 2015) Lastly, if the UNSC is discussing a conflict where a member state is a 
participating party, then that member must abstain from voting. Based on this it can 
be concluded that although the five permanent members are able to veto any decision, 
thereby possessing huge powers in relation to the decision making process. 
Nonetheless other member states also have an opportunity to vote and influence the 
outcome, yet they do not have as much power as the permanent members. 
Before the UNSC can initiate any action in a given situation, in order to uphold or 
restore international peace and security, its members have to agree upon a 
determination of “the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act 
of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be 
taken”(Un.org Chapter VII, 2015) These measures are based on article 41 and 42, and 
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can include different types of sanctions, diplomatic negotiations and actions involving 
both military and non-military humanitarian intervention (Un.org Chapter VII, 2015). 
Although the UNSC can initiate military action, it also has to protect the “territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state”. (Un.org Purposes and Principles of 
the United Nations, 2015) article 2(4)) Article 2 regulates the use of force when 
authorization of humanitarian interventions, such as when peacekeeping operations, 
are in question.  Article 2 also limits the UN from engaging in domestic affairs, but it 
allows “application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII”. This effectively 
means that the UN can intervene in the domestic affairs of a state ”when pursuing 
enforcement measures stipulated in Chapter VII” (Fischer, 2009: 5).  The journal 
article ““The Legitimacy to Legitimise”: The Security Council Action in Libya under 
Resolution 1973” which is a law review examines the legitimacy of the intervention 
in Libya, how it was legitimized, and if the mandate that was given in “Resolution 
1973” was exceeded. The method they are using is basically a law review of the 
powers that were given, if the intervening member states exceeded that mandate. Our 
focus will not be if whether the mandate was exceeded or not, but rather if the states 
changed their view on the legitimacy of the UNSC. With focus on the mandate, it can 
be argued that they UNSC will lose their legitimacy naturally, as they are behaving in 
a way, which is not approved by the international community and the actors within it.  
  
When looking at the voting process of the UNSC, it is essential to mention that from 
the creation of the UN in 1945, until the end of the Cold war in 1990, veto practices 
were common, while initiation of humanitarian interventions were very rare. 
It almost was the norm, rather than the exception that the two rivaling superpowers, 
USA and USSR, exercised their veto rights on questions of humanitarian aid, thereby 
weakening the overall coercion of the UNSC. (Fischer, 2009: 5).  But after the end of 
the Cold War this practice has certainly changed, especially the last 15 years, since it 
is now uncommon that vetoes are used when questions of humanitarian aid arrives at 
the UNSC (Security Council Report, 2013). First the UNSC has “broadened its 
concept of security”, in praxis this means that the number of issues viewed as a threat 
to international peace and security have become higher than before. (Fischer, 2009: 6) 
E.g, the UNSC have chosen to declare military intrastate conflicts as threats to 
international peace, and security, by using its powers granted by chapter VII in the 
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UN Charter more often than before (Anon, 2015). Three types of action under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, can be authorized by the UNSC. It can authorize a peace 
operation carried out by member states, and/or a regional organization, and it can 
authorize the UN itself to initiate a peacekeeping operation (Fischer, 2009). These 
missions are different in many ways, but it is fair to say that the implementation of 
these three peace operations have become more common now. The increased number 
of interventions the UNSC authorizes does to what they consider crimes against 
humanity, can be seen as a new perception of what is understood as legitimate 
humanitarian intervention. This argument is supported by the fact that during the 
period of 1945 to 1990, the Council rarely agreed on humanitarian intervention (List 
of Peacekeeping Operations, 2015) 
  
The way the UN peacekeeping operations are conducted now, have changed from the 
time of the Cold War, when peacekeeping missions were “tasked to perform 
operations like observation and monitoring, separating combatant forces, establishing 
buffer zones and making use of limited force in order to maintain or restore civil law 
and order”(Fischer, 2009: 6).  
In recent times the peace operations are more complex since they often involve the 
use of military force. When the UN wants to maintain civil law and order, or restore 
peace and security, in operations such as monitoring of democratic elections, 
enforcement of human rights, and disarmament of combatants, they often turn to 
some kind of military action. 
(Fischer, 2009 : 6) 
In the post Cold War, in the UNSC it is also often the case that a weak action is better 
than no action at all, this certainly represents a change from earlier times where the 
risk of a veto often endangered any action at all. To conclude the view of what is 
considered legitimate humanitarian intervention, and how often it should be exercised 
have changed, since the 1990, and it is much more common for humanitarian 
intervention to happen, and it also regularly revolves around the use of force in some 
shape or fashion. 
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The	historical	aspect	of	the	intervention	in	Libya		
To understand why the Libyan intervention happened, we will look at the historical 
aspects, and how the UNSC handled the situation. 
In February 2011, during what is know as “The Arab Spring”, the population of 
several Middle Eastern countries developed uprisings against the regimes in their 
respective countries, the peaceful demonstrations started to occur in Benghazi in the 
North Eastern part of Libya (Ijoc.org, 2015). This was demonstrations against the 
leader Muammar Gaddafi’s 42 year old regime (Ijoc.org, 2015). After three days of 
ongoing demonstrations, militant Libyan security forces were inserted and several 
demonstrators were killed (Bowen, 2011) (Ramoin, 2012). 
The acts of aggression towards the Libyan population lead to sanctions on Gaddafi 
and his family by the UNSC, and it resulted in the Council adopting “Resolution 
1970” on February 26 2011 (Antonopoulos, 2012: 361) 
 
The resolution included non-military actions and sanctions, but Gadaffi and his 
regime chose to ignore them, and when his troops were poised to retake the rebel 
stronghold of Benghazi, the UNSC then adopted a more inclusive resolution on the 
17th of March (Antonopoulos, 2012: 362). The “Resolution 1973” suspended Libya 
from the UN human rights council, and it implemented a no-fly zone over Libyan 
airspace, which “The Arab League” (Arableagueonline.org, 2014) had asked for 
(Antonopoulos, 2012: 362). The UNSC afterward stressed the need of finding a 
solution to the crisis, and demanded that Libyan authorities obeyed their obligations 
to international law and responsibility to protect its civilians (Antonopoulos, 2012: 
362). 
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The “Resolution 1973” was met by vote of 10 in favor to none in the UNSC, while 
five members abstained from voting (Brazil, China, India, Germany and Russia). The 
resolution authorized member states to take the “all necessary measures” regarding 
action to protect the Libyan civilians from humanitarian crimes, but excluded foreign 
occupation in any form (Security Council, 2011). Resolution 1973 included a demand 
of an immediate ceasefire, including an end to the attacks on civilians, which was 
considered as a crime against humanity. Furthermore it implemented the 
aforementioned no-fly zone in Libyan airspace, which is  different approach than the 
Resolution 1970 that initiated strict sanctions on the Gaddafi regime and its 
supporters, such as freezing the assets Gaddafi had in foreign countries, but did not 
include a no-fly zone. (Antonopoulos, 2012: 362).The no-fly zone did not apply 
flights with humanitarian purpose or evacuations of foreign nationals, instead all 
Libyan commercial aircrafts were banned from take off in both Libya and any other 
country. Lastly, the resolution also established an arms embargo, in order to stop 
Libya from buying weapons or military equipment (Security Council, 2011). 
The UNSC members who voted in favor of resolution 1973, clearly stated that they 
needed the support from the Arab League to initiate any military action against Libya. 
Since they did not want to commit the same mistakes as they did in the war in Iraq, 
where the coalition led by the US went beyond the UNSC, thereby being accused of 
doing “neocolonial imperialist exercises” (Ramoin, 2012).   
Regional support from the neighboring countries, and organizations such as the Arab 
League of Nations and the African Union, was one of the important political steps, to 
ensure the coalition assistance to the opposition, led by NTC (Ramoin, 2012). 
Due to the fact that the Libyan civilians continued to oppose their regime, and since 
Gaddafi continued to use force against the opposition, it was believed that the Gaddafi 
regime had lost all domestic and international legitimacy (Ramoin, 2012). 
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The UNSC had initiated the process to put an end to the humanitarian crimes because 
they found it legitimate to conclude that the Libyan authorities, through its actions, 
had shown that it could not live up to protecting the rights of its own people, thereby 
failing its responsibility to protect its citizens (responsibilitytoprotect.org, 2015). 
“Resolution 1973” was based on “The Responsibility to Protect act (R2P), which is 
built upon the principle that states have the responsibility to protect their civilians 
from four violations of human rights; genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. If it is concluded that a state fails to comply with this 
responsibility, it is then the responsibility of the international society, specifically the 
UNSC, to authorize humanitarian intervention and decide if use of military force is 
necessary. 
Furthermore, the Foreign Minister of France, Alain Juppé, stated, “The situation on 
the ground is more alarming than ever, marked by the violent re-conquest of cities 
that have been released” (Security Council, 2011).  Juppé also stated before the 
approval of “resolution 1973”, that the World was experiencing “a wave of great 
revolutions that would change the course of history”, (Security Council, 2011) as the 
populations in the regions of North Africa and the Middle East were calling for 
changes because they had lost faith in their authorities. 
Before the humanitarian intervention in Libya, both NATO and the US took similar 
basic conditions for authorizing use of military force. The conditions were; a 
demonstrable need for intervention, a clear legal basis for intervention; and firm 
regional support for the intervention. (Ramoin, 2012; Politico Staff, 2011) (Ramoin, 
2012;Xuequan, 2011). 
We will now focus on the voting regarding the situation in Libya and how to interact 
with the situation, then on how the UNSC is legitimate as an international 
organization. Furthermore we will do this by examine how the UNSC is a system and 
then argue if it is a validity system due to Ian Hurd’s theory about validity. 
Furthermore how to analyze if the UNSC is a system and legitimacy is seen, we have 
analyzed statements from states representatives. 
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 The Security Council is one of the most powerful organizations in the World and is 
well known for being the executive agency of the UN, with focus on keeping 
international peace and security (Hurd, 2007: 12-13). Additionally the Council is one 
of the most powerful actors within international politics, as that is where the decisions 
are being made and the voting takes place. The members who voted for the 
intervention in the Council viewed the intervention as legitimate due to the principle 
R2P. The UNSC voted to approve a no-fly zone (Resolution 1973) over Libya and all 
necessary measures except for military occupation, to protect the civilians. The 
members who voted were the five permanent members (UK, USA, Russia, China, 
France) and the 10 non-permanent members: Bosnia, Brazil, Gabon, Lebanon, 
Nigeria, Colombia, Germany, India, Portugal and South Africa. Ten of the members 
voted for the intervention, including permanent members: USA, UK and France, 
while the remaining five abstained including permanent members China and Russia 
(IBT Staff Report, 2011). The resolution that the UNSC had implemented as an 
attempt to prevent Gaddafi in his violations against humanity, was resolution 1973 
that came after resolution 1970. Both resolutions focused on the Libyan authorities to 
immediately cease their violations against fundamental human rights. The Libyan 
government did not obey from the request from the UNSC (NATO, 2011). By having 
a voting system there need to be a majority of votes in favor to support the 
intervention in Libya, before it can be a reality. Through this process the system gains 
validity. This will affect how the UNSC is seen, and it will be seen as an authority in 
its sphere (Hurd, 2007: 47). Although the UN and the UNSC is seen as legitimate, it 
does not give it any power outside its authority regarding World peace and security 
(Hurd, 2007: 47). When legitimacy occurs in international society, it changes the 
strategic situation of the states, and it affects the behavior as well. This goes hand in 
hand with how legitimacy occurs in the first place, where a shared belief of 
‘rightness’ will be necessary (Hurd, 2007: 31). With this social structure in an 
international organization it affects both the ‘stronger’ and the ‘weaker’ actor, even if 
an actor is trying to resist the force of internalization, such as voting against 
something in the UNSC. This means the actor will still be affected by the presence of 
the legitimate institution. The UN could only be created because the individual state 
reconfigures its interest by being internalized. This is done, because the state 
redefines its interest from how the rules and norms are in an institution. Yet a rule will 
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only be legitimate when the states start redefining their interest, and goes with what 
the institutions’ rules or norms that have been established (Hurd, 2007:31). To sum 
up, Dahl and Lindblom contend, “Control is legitimate to the extent that it is approved 
or regarded as ‘right’” (Hurd, 2007: 31).  When looking at the UNSC and the Charter 
it is not the official powers that are relevant, but more the actions and the capacity to 
persuade, which is very much depending on the state’s view and belief about its 
legitimacy. Inis Claude argues that before the Council can act effectively, it needs to 
be seen as legitimate. Nonetheless when it is seen as legitimate, it has great power 
(Hurd, 2007: 15). This is essential to our project, as we focus on the legitimacy of the 
UNSC and the understanding from our chosen states. It has been argued that if an 
actor, e.g. a state is placed in a socially constructed context, herein the UN, then 
legitimacy becomes a socially constructed phenomenon, which affects the strategic 
calculations and self-conceptions of these actors (Hurd, 2007: 16). This is an 
interesting argument, as we are examining how the US, Russia and China view 
legitimacy themselves, compared to the UN, herein Ban-ki moon. Furthermore the 
three states seek a certain symbol or recognition from their actions, and this can be 
achieve by being a member of the UN, as the UN’s primary job is to “determine the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression”(Hurd, 
2007: 13). Furthermore the R2P’s core principle is to protect civilians against 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (Notaras and 
Popovski, 2015). In order to achieve this symbolic status, the states will have to spend 
both energy and money to gain the symbolic status, and again, this can be done 
through the UNSC and R2P (Hurd, 2007: 16). This though relies on a certain need for 
legitimacy, again due to the fact that legitimacy equals power (Hurd, 2007: 15). With 
this in mind, it makes sense to argue that institutions such as the UN are just a set of 
processes and a machine, for the member states to achieve their interests, furthermore, 
"international organizations (IOs) exist, therefore, and states choose to respect them, 
because IOs allow states to reach utility levels that they could not reach without 
them” (Hurd, 2007: 18). This argument also supports the claim that sometimes it is in 
the self-interest of states to choose to follow an organization (Hurd, 2007: 19). When 
we work with constructivism it is essential to point out two central aspects. The first 
is, “that the fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than 
strictly material”, secondary, “that these structures shape actors’ identities and 
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interests, rather than just their behaviour” (Hurd, 2007: 19). When it argues the 
structures in international politics shape the actors’ identities and interest, then it 
support our argument above that the states participate in the UN, to achieve a 
symbolic status, and to please their self-interest.   
How	internalization	influence	the	decisions	
Internationalization revolves around actors in the international community. If actors 
collaborate on a certain topic, it can be seen as them sharing the same beliefs. This 
can motivate the individual actors, herein the states in the international community, in 
the social system to provide a certain social order. (Hurd, 2007). The creation of R2P 
supports this theory, due to the fact that the member states in the UN have all agreed 
on the makings of R2P and what the intention behind it. 
Furthermore the resolutions demanded that the Libyan authorities had to fulfil their 
obligations under international law, which states that the government have to protect 
their civilians against genocide and violations of human rights (United Nations, 
2011). 
The intervention occurred due to the principle of R2P being exceeded, but it is 
important to note that R2P is not a law, but a principle (E-International Relations, 
2015). Additionally, President Obama stated his position on the situation in Libya and 
the humanitarian intervention. He argued, that there was a need for assistance to 
protect the Libyan civilians. In order to apply assistance, and basically save the lives 
of the civilians, Obama argued that action was necessary, and that it should be 
initiated within the UNSC and by implementing R2P. He also stated that Gaddafi had 
lost his legitimacy, by killing civilians and therefore deserved punishment for his 
actions (Lindström and Zetterlund :42). In an internalized society, this makes sense 
due to the fact that the other actors within the UNSC, all stated the same belief that 
the lack of morality shown  by Gaddafi, through his actions, could not be accepted. 
To support the argument from Obama about Gaddafi’s actions being morally wrong, 
and therefore as a result not legitimate, one have to understand that legitimacy is not 
about true ‘rightness’ or ‘goodness’, it is about the individual’s perception of 
‘rightness’ and ‘goodness’ (Hurd, 2007: 33). With this aspect of legitimacy, it was 
important for Obama to be sure that the other actors in the UNSC shared the same 
belief. If this was not the case, then it might not be correct what Obama stated, as it is 
up to the individual actor to decide what they think is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. This 
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showed that the UNSC, and the Libyan authorities, had different perceptions of 
‘rightness’, and then they will not be able to legitimize their actions (Hurd, 2007: 33). 
Furthermore, the control being used will not be legitimate, as long as the different 
actors do not see the actions as morally ‘right’ (Hurd, 2007: 31). Ban Ki-moon held a 
speech, with focus on the importance of the UN as an international organisation, and 
how important it is to show the responsibility, that the UN has as an actor in the 
international society. This makes the international system valid, because it reflects on 
the individual state's legitimate perception of the UNSC. The actors in the UNSC 
share the same belief and they can therefore change the strategic settings of the 
decisions. These decisions will then have an impact on all of the actors, which in this 
case will be, that all member states within the UNSC are expected to contribute to the 
intervention in Libya in one way or another. If there was not a voting system in the 
UNSC, and there was not a majority for the intervention, then it would affect the 
validity of the system (Hurd, 2007: 47). 
Not all member states in the UNSC were demanding an intervention like the US, as 
there were different perceptions of what kind of approach should be taken. Some 
suggested diplomatic negotiations, and others even feared that an intervention could 
lead to the UNSC losing credibility the legitimacy of the UNSC. 
As Vitaly Churkin, Russian UN representative, who also was a part of the UNSC 
meeting regarding the situation in Libya, 2011, states, “In essence, a whole range of 
questions raised by Russia and other members of the Council remained unanswered. 
Those questions were concrete and legitimate and touched on how the no-fly zone 
would be enforced, what the rules of engagement would be and what limits on the use 
of force there would be” (United Nations Security Council, 2011) 
Another view is how Mr. Li Baodong, the UN representative of China, expresses his 
and the state of China’s unwillingness to use force in international relations. He 
states  “China is always against the use of force in international relations. In the 
Security Council’s consultations on resolution 1973 (2011), we and other Council 
members asked specific questions. However, regrettably, many of those questions 
failed to be clarified or answered. China has serious difficulty with parts of the 
resolution.” (Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, 2011). 
Both Russia and China then questions the legitimacy of the UNSC, as there are 
questions due to the actions in relation to the humanitarian intervention in Libya. This 
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statement clearly support, that even if actors are in the same international community, 
there can still be different perceptions of legitimacy. Churkin states, that there were 
numerous reasons for why Russia abstained in the voting of the draft resolution on 
Libya, but that their position regarding the use of force against the civilian population 
remains unchanged, which is that any attack against civilians and violations of the 
international humanitarian law must immediately cease. He stated, that the document 
about the no-fly zone, does not keep with the standard practice in the UNSC, and that 
many questions raised by Russia and other members of the Council remained 
unanswered. These questions were about how the no-fly zone would be enforced, 
what rules the engagement would be, and the limits on the use of force (United 
Nations Security Council, 2011). 
Mr.Li Badong, goes on to explain how UNSC members have questioned the 
resolution, yet they have not received a clear answer, he goes on to mention the 
overall dissatisfaction that China has with the resolution (Permanent Mission of the 
People's Republic of China to the UN, 2011). This statement goes along with the 
traditional non-intervention approach China has to intervention. Furthermore China 
does support the UNSC as they see the Council to be authoritative and have 
legitimacy (Hurd, 2007: 30), due to how the member states do accept the main task of 
the UN, and specific the UNSC. 
Additionally both Russia and China believe that the international community and how 
one proceed within it, reveals the identity of the states (Ferdinand, 2013: 10). This is 
another reason why both Russia and China abstained in relation to the voting 
regarding the intervention in Libya. As previously mentioned, this is a essential to 
analyze when having a constructivist approach, due to the fact that it argues “that 
these structures shape actors’ identities and interests, rather than just their 
behaviour” (Hurd, 2007: 19). 
In the international community, China and Russia have a different understanding of 
foreign intervention, than the US, which includes different ideas about how foreign 
intervention should be handled. All three states had different interests in Libya, which 
will be discussed further in the ‘business part’ of the analysis. These different 
perceptions reflects how the international community functions. Even more so, it 
shows the diversity in the international community, as all three states, the US, China 
and Russia have different opinions about intervention. This only supports the 
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argument that the UNSC is perceived to be legitimate, as different states come 
together, due to the fact that they agree on upholding peace in the international 
society, but that they might have a different approach on how to do it. As stated 
before,  China is traditionally seen as having a non-intervention policy. They have a 
‘five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’, which include non-intervening and to 
protect the sovereignty of the states (En.people.cn, 2015). It is then clear that in an 
international community there are still different approaches, as the US were positive 
towards the intervention, whereas Russia and China would have preferred a different 
approach, but was still supportive to the extent that it should prevent genocide to 
happen in Libya (Hurd, 2007: 31). 
When China in the fall of 2011 abstained from vote on the interventions against the 
events in Libya,  some actors within the international community questioned the 
Chinese decision. When China later failed to withhold the 1970 resolution, by having 
business relations with individuals that worked within or had ties to the Libyan 
regime (Madsen and Selbæk: 47), it raised even more questions from these actors. But 
due to the fact that the resolution was not legally binding, China could not be held 
legally accountable, and therefore no ramifications could be applied (NATO.int, 
2011). In spite of this, China could still risk to lose accountability in a symbolic way, 
and therefore still be punished because of the other states’ views, on China and their 
collaborations in the proposal from the UNSC about an intervention in Libya. The 
European Council elaborated on China’s decision in both the 1970 resolution, as well 
as in the voting regarding the intervention in Libya, they stated “The arms deals 
highlighted how Chinese arms companies have an economic interest that can clash 
with China’s multilateral reputation and with other economic interests from Chinese 
construction companies in quickly picking up where they left in Libya before the 
conflict”(Parello-Plesner, 2011). But as Dahl and Lindblom argues, the control that 
the UNSC has can only be legitimate to the extent that it is approved or regarded as 
‘right’ (Hurd, 2007: 31), where all three states agreed on the need for intervention, but 
it was the procedure of the UNSC, that is being questioned. This support the argument 
of Claude (Hurd, 2007: 15), who argues that the UNSC can only be and act 
effectively, if there is an overall opinion of the UNSC to be legitimate. Furthermore, 
when being legitimate it has great powers, which in this case is seen in the 
intervention. 
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In the beginning there were some speculations, and a sceptic approach, to the 
involvement of the US in the intervention. This sceptical approach was seen with 
Robert Gates who was in the Secretary of Defence, he said: “... A no-fly zone begins 
with an attack on Libya to destroy the air defences. … But that’s the way it starts” 
(York, 2011). Furthermore, Hillary Clinton, who was a part of the Secretary of State, 
was also sceptical and kept saying that the no-fly zone was only a consideration. 
(York, 2011) After the Arab League was requesting some actions from the UNSC, 
then Hillary Clinton started to support Obama on his wish for intervention and to help 
the Libyan civilians. She stated that the intervention would “prevent a great 
humanitarian disaster” (York, 2011) 
With the pressure from the Arab League, Clinton felt that the US should stand with 
the other actors and show that the UN is legitimate. This was done by supporting their 
decisions when it came to the actions, especially to be a part of the international 
community. This is also the symbolic value the US seeked, because they could then 
appear as legitimate in their actions to the rest of the world, “For the symbolic 
meaning of an object to function, its referent must be understood by both the user of 
the symbol and the audience” (Hurd, 2007: 53). Furthermore, Clinton states that one 
of the reasons for the US to help was because of their relations to their allies in 
NATO. These allies helped them when they went into war in Afghanistan, and now 
they have asked for help from the US, she states: “The attack came on us…They stuck 
with us.  When it comes to Libya, we started hearing from the UK, France, Italy, other 
of our NATO allies…This was in their vital national interest…" (York, 2011) 
This statement support Hurd’s theory about how the internalization resulted in a 
common opinion about right and wrong, and furthermore, that it creates an 
international organization, which is legitimate. Additionally the US’ engagement in 
the intervention was a sort of ‘payback’ to the countries who helped them. It was this 
symbolic gesture that the US would attain by giving assistance. It would definitely 
strengthen the UN’s legitimacy. 
It also reflects the self-interest of Obama, by receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, it is his 
job to try to act within concept of what is understood as being responsibly. 
Furthermore, it also affects the credibility of the UN, therefore the symbolic aspect 
had influence on the decision of intervention as well. Obama states that it is important 
for the UN to stand together (Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012: 47) through the UNSC 
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and R2P, and show the UN’s credibility, and more important that the UNSC retains 
its legitimacy. 
The US Department of State’s Country Report on Terrorism in 2008 stated, that the 
Libyan government had helped the US and the international community to fight 
against terrorism and terrorist financing, this includes that Libya also helped fight 
against Al-Qaeda, which were the terrorist who attacked the US at 9/11 (Blanchard & 
Zanotti, 2011: 13-15). At that point, the Libyan regime was an affiliate to the US’ 
fight against terrorism. But as the Libyan regime became a threat to their own 
civilians, and became unstable, the US was worried about the prospects of Libya 
going into full scale civil war, and create chaos in the country, and even the region. 
Due to the interest explained before, the US were more willing to intervene and 
therefore “obey” to the demand of the UNSC and the international community, 
especially from their NATO allies UK and France. As a result of the US intervention 
in Libya, they prevented the Libyan regime to continue to crimes against the Libyan 
civilians, while acting to the principle of R2P, which gave them legitimacy to act, 
while also protecting their own self-interest. Another aspect on why the US 
intervened was to show the world that UNSC is a credible and legitimate institution. 
(Hurd, 2007: 37)         
Susan Rice talked about the sanctions and no-fly zone, and how the resolution 
strengthens enforcement of the arms embargo and freezing the assets of some key 
State-owned companies in Libya. She ended her speech by saying: 
“The future of Libya should be decided by the people of Libya. The United States 
stands with the Libyan people in support of their universal rights.”(United Nations, 
2011) 
How	moral	influence	the	decisions		
Despite the Council earlier had adopted a resolution against Libya that showed the 
disapproval of the UNSC of Gaddafi’s continuance of systematic and grossly 
violation of the rights of the Libyan people. By having this disapproval the UN is 
acting with coercion, and by doing this they are trying to stop Gaddafi by setting 
sanctions. In internalization, coercion creates an asymmetric relationship in this case 
between Gaddafi and the UN (Hurd, 2007: 35). With this asymmetric relationship, 
then the ‘stronger’ agent, herein the UN attempts to change the behavior of the 
‘weaker’ agent, Gaddafi and his regime. As previously mentioned, this form of 
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coercion is a simple way to gain control in social relation. Furthermore, the UN have 
the same moral belief, and that was what resulted in coercion, due to the fact that 
Gaddafi did not live up to these moral expectations (Hurd, 2007: 36). Thus it did not 
affected Gaddafi to stop his crimes against humanity and therefore, the UN had to 
take action in relation to stop the violations of the human rights in Libya, and did this 
with the implementation of R2P. 
Susan Rice, the United Nations ambassador and a National Security Council staff, 
also stated that the approval of a no-fly zone was an answer to The Arab League’s call 
on the Council to take stronger measures against Gaddafi, which then was the final 
answer to their coercion, this is the consequence for Gaddafi from not responding 
morally ‘right’ to their threats. The Arab League is an international organization that 
reaches from northern and northeastern Africa to southwest Asia. When the Arab 
League reaches out to the UN for help, then it signals that there is need for help, due 
to the fact that the situation affects the countries around Libya as well. The 
authorization of using force was to protect civilians against Gaddafi's allied forces and 
mercenaries; this goes along with how R2P is supposed to apply. R2P’s first pillar 
states that: “The state carries the primary responsibility for the protection its citizens 
from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.” 
(Responsibilitytoprotect.org, 2015). Gaddafi failed to do so, and the UNSC and R2P 
has to be used for then to prevent a possible genocide. Rice stressed that the Libyan 
people should decide the future of Libya, and taking drastic actions could only help to 
do this. The US stood with the people of Libya in their struggle to exercise their 
fundamental rights (United Nations Security Council, 2011) , with this statement it 
goes together with internalization, because of the shared belief of what is ‘wrong’ and 
‘right’ in the aspect of morality. When there is this shared belief, it creates an 
international society and it makes the decisions that are made in this international 
society legitimate. It states the internalization takes place when there are forces 
outside an actor who affect the single actor’s own interests and in the UN this interest 
comes from norms, values and laws that exist in the international community. 
Internalization can also appear when the individual’s thoughts are being changed due 
to the interest of being a part of an international community (Hurd, 2007: 31).   
A validity system functions best when all actors are agreeing on how to behave and 
see the same things as legitimate, as a result of having the same belief. Putting this in 
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context to our project, Hurd argues “When that process is widely shared at the 
individual level, it affects the structure of the system overall by shaping the 
expectations for all actors about what it constitutes as a normal pattern of behaviour” 
(Hurd, 2007: 45). 
As a result of internalization and being a part of the international community, Russia 
questions the legitimacy of the decision made by the Council (The Embassy of the 
Russian Federation in Canada, 2011), and states that if any serious failures or issues 
occur as a result from the intervention, then the actors who intervened would be 
viewed as responsible by Russia (The Embassy of the Russian Federation in Canada, 
2011). Additionally, to this Russia states that even with scepticism towards the 
intervention, they will still avoid being “responsible for blocking the intervention if 
the result would be a large-scale massacre of civilians” (Golunov et al., 2012: 38). 
This moral aspect goes hand in hand with two things, firstly, how the UNSC 
optimally should function, with same belief on how to keep peace in the World and 
protect humanity, secondly, this is traditionally done by prioritizing dialog over 
military intervention when solving political conflicts. With this statement from Russia 
they are questioning the entire international community as a system, due to the fact, 
that the UNSC’s solution to the crisis in Libya was not the way Russia would have 
done it (The Embassy of the Russian Federation in Canada, 2011) . This way of 
thinking drives the Russian politics in a more self-interested direction. This 
establishes that they recognize the need to follow the rules and that it correspond to 
their own attitude and benefits their own self-interests (Hurd, 2007: 32). Nonetheless, 
it goes in hand with the ‘rightness’ aspect that Russia should share with the other 
members of the UNSC, as this perspective will amongst the other states make the 
UNSC legitimate (Hurd, 2007: 30). 
Additionally Russia argues the no-fly zone as being debatable, whereas the US argues 
that it was a legitimate way to solve the issue, Rice stated: "I swore to myself that if I 
ever faced such a crisis again, I would come down on the side of dramatic action, 
going down in flames if that was required." (Jackson, 2011). In all international 
communities there will be different perceptions, as it is very natural, but it is then an 
important factor to focus on the shared beliefs, as both China, the US and Russia 
focuses on helping the Libyan civilians (Hurd, 2007: 31). Their interest was partly 
constituted by R2P, which everyone in the UN has signed on and sees as legitimate. 
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Regarding the negotiations on the draft, Vitaly Churkin the Russian UN 
representative stated: 
“I underscore yet again that we are consistent and firm advocates of the protection of 
the civilian population. […] Russia did not prevent the adoption of this resolution. 
However, we remain convinced that the quickest way to ensure robust security for the 
civilian population and the long-term stabilization of the situation in Libya is an 
immediate ceasefire”(United Nations Security Council, 2011) This again shows that 
even though Russia questions the resolution, their interest is still to help the civilians 
in Libya and stabilize the situation, even if their perception is different than the 
outcome of the meeting.   
The responsibility for the humanitarian consequences - which Churkin states will be 
inevitable, with the use of outside force in Libya will fall on the shoulders of those 
who undertake such action. He ends his speech by saying: 
“If this comes to pass, then not only the civilian population of Libya but also the 
cause of upholding peace and security throughout the entire region of North Africa 
and the Middle East will suffer. Such destabilizing developments must be 
avoided.”(United Nations Security Council, 2011)  With this argument it does reflect 
on how international communities should function, and it questions the validity of the 
system. When an actor as Russia states, that if anything should happen because of the 
intervention, they will give up all responsibility, then it definitely questions the 
legitimacy of the UNSC and the system’s validity. A different approach to this is that 
one of the reasons that the US would approve the intervention, was due to the tragedy 
that happened in Srebrenica and Rwanda was still in the memory of the 
Administration of the US, therefore it was a risk to take if the US did not support the 
intervention. (Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012: 47). Furthermore, it would be a more 
symbolic issue if the US abstained or did not support the intervention. A different 
approach towards the UNSC such as when Obama states when he received the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 2009, he states: “There will be times when nations - acting individually 
or in concert - will find the use of force not only necessary but morally 
justified”(Lindström and Zetterlund, 2012: 47). With this statement he assures that the 
UN stands together and there should be a unified decision to aid the Libyan civilians. 
Furthermore Russia did share the same belief about what the UN has as responsibility 
and how legitimate they are in the international community, they therefore felt a 
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pressure to adapt to the Western opinion about intervention in Libya (Hurd, 2007: 31). 
To support this argument, Ban Ki-moon who is the Secretary-General of the UN, 
states, ”The international community has acted together to avert a potential larger-
scale crisis.”(United Nations, 2011). This statement confirms the need for a shared 
belief on ‘the rightness’ among the states in the UNSC to create a legitimate reason 
for intervening. If no majority were found supporting the intervention, all the actions 
would not be legitimate (Hurd, 2007: 33). Ki-moon states the importance of a united 
UNSC standing together with one voice (United Nations, 2011), and by this method 
the problem in Libya should be tackled, this supports how to make an international 
organization and the actions within it legitimate (Hurd, 2007: 30). 
He argues that due to the fact that Tunisia and Egypt have asked for help and have 
accepted a huge amount of refugees, there is a need for addressing the situation 
through the UN and with implementing R2P (United Nations, 2011). He focuses very 
much on saving innocent civilians who is suffering from the violations carried out by 
Gaddafi’s regime (United Nations, 2011). Before the intervention took place, there 
had been some conversations between the Libyan authorities and Ki-moon’s Special 
Envoy to Libya, Abdul Ilah al-Khatib and the US Humanitarian Coordinator. They 
were attempting to change the way Gaddafi was leading Libya in relation to the 
violations against humanity (United Nations, 2011). 
As mentioned before, with this seek for solidarity among the states in the international 
community the decision of a no-fly zone and the military intervention becomes 
legitimate. Hurd argues, “legitimacy refers to the belief by an actor that a rule or 
institution ought to be obeyed” (Hurd, 2007: 30). This is a result of internalization 
where with the creation of R2P has resulted in a common opinion about how the 
responsibility to protect civilians is a greater responsibility to be shared (Hurd, 2007: 
31). Another focus point, is that the Russian government have signed the UN Charter 
and have agreed on R2P, which states that if a state fail their obligations to protect 
their citizens, the international community would help to do so.  The Russian decision 
making process was influenced by moral beliefs, which was shared in the UNSC. At 
the same time Russia struggles with being coerced to go against own self-interests in 
Libya, to maintain the international relations they have with the Western alliance. 
This internalization makes them bound by the norms that exists in the international 
community.   
Rasmus	Jacobsen,	Victor	Kenting,		 Group	20	 The	21st	of	December	Ditlev	Herzland,	Hakan	Eroglu,		Rasmus	Hviid	and	Maria	Christiansen	
	 38	
The spokesperson of the Foreign Minister of China, Jiang Yu states, that the moral 
aspect of the government of China is “About the situation in Libya, we feel saddened 
by the casualties caused by violence. We uphold that Security Council Resolution 
1970 should be implemented earnestly and call on parties in Libya to cease fire 
immediately to avoid further civilian casualties and resolve the current crisis through 
dialogue and other peaceful means. We hope the international community will play a 
constructive role in easing the situation.” (Embassy of the People's Republic of China 
in the Republic of Uganda, 2011) 
Yu is expressing sadness on behalf of the Chinese nation due to the loss of civilians 
because of the general violence in Libya, which shows the moral aspect of the actions 
and statements to abstain from the vote. If China vetoed this resolution they would be 
to blame for the several civilian casualties and the humanitarian disaster that would 
occur if Gaddafi continued. It is this moral obligation and common belief among the 
UNSC members that influenced China to abstain from the vote, and not follow their 
traditional policy of non-intervention. 
Yu mentions that China still stays true to resolution 1970, therefore China is still 
acknowledging the legitimacy of the UN and therefore the principle of R2P. Yet Yu 
still refers to China’s aforementioned traditional style of non-intervention, which 
shows that China is still not satisfied with the implementation of the intervention and 
that China will always solve issues via dialogue instead of military intervention. By 
China abstaining it goes along with the statement where Yu mentions her sadness for 
the casualties, and that China do not only have a self-interest (Embassy of the 
People's Republic of China in the Republic of Uganda, 2011). 
In addition, this statement clearly shows the concern of China for Libya, they choose 
to abstain from the vote due to their disagreement with the contents of the resolution. 
This can be explained by the moral aspect of ‘rightness’ of their actions, a shared 
common belief between the UN members that is seen as morally ‘right’ (Hurd, 2007: 
32). If the Chinese government choose to veto, and Gaddafi continues his onslaught 
of human rights violations, that veto would be seen as morally incorrect. The 
responsibility of this humanitarian disaster would be put on China due to the fact that 
they vetoed against, the resolution that would stop Gaddafi (Hurd, 2007:37). The 
Chinese representative clearly states that China has always been against the use of 
force in international community. Also even though China has several interests and 
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citizens in the country they abstain. This can be related back to the theory of 
internalization. Where the nation in question regardless of self-interest or the 
punishment from the international community, will act in the interest of the 
international community, and do what is considered morally ‘right’ according to 
them. If it was up to China to make this decision independently, it would most likely 
end with the situation where China acted in their own self-interest.  They therefore 
needed to consider their belief of ‘rightness’ due to the intervention, and due to the 
fact that this ‘rightness’ was shared by the other actors in the UNSC. The argument 
for intervention was that the UNSC needed to protect the civilians in Libya, which 
also was the foreign workers, such as the Chinese citizens. It was then both in favor of 
China due to the citizens that an intervention happened, as well as the civilians of 
Libya. To sum up, China having business opportunities and its own citizens in Libya, 
this will be explained in the next section, means there is a great element of self-
interest for China to keep Libya stable, yet China has a very non-intervention policy 
towards foreign affairs, the only choice China had was to abstain from voting this way 
China was able to stay true to its core self-interest. 
But there is more than just the moral aspect of the intervention. The states are also 
aware of the self-interest and what they can afford to risk by not intervening in 
counter to the symbolic achievement that they would benefit from intervening. 
	
How	business	influence	the	decisions			
Prime minister Lavrov of Russia states that the UN is unique and worth having the 
international community, he is also concerned that the intervention in Libya will be 
implemented in future decisions of intervention, and the same approach will be used. 
“... Because the “Libyan model” was a flagrant violation of the Security Council 
decisions, and therefore – a violation of international law: when the adopted UNSC 
resolutions (both the first, consensus one, supported by all members of the Security 
Council, which imposed an arms embargo, and the second, providing for a no-fly 
zone, on which we together with our BRICS partners and Germany abstained) were 
grossly violated by the North Atlantic Alliance during their implementation.” (The 
Embassy of the Russian Federation in Canada, 2011). This concern was shared with 
China, who was concerned that the humanitarian intervention would not stay as a 
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case-to-case issue, but rather become a norm for how an international issue should be 
handled at all time. This goes along with China’s general thoughts of intervention in 
the first place, it should only be in a very urgent situation (Madsen and Selsbæk: 48). 
This statement goes against the vision on how the UN and the UNSC should function, 
and work, as a system, Lavrov stated that “There is a group of countries, especially 
Western countries, and some Arab regimes that believe the so-called “concept of the 
responsibility to protect” must be universally applied in all cases when people begin 
to show displeasure and when against the various protest manifestations the 
authorities use force to restore order.” (The Embassy of the Russian Federation in 
Canada, 2011).                                                                      
In this statement, it is clear that he does not support the view of certain Western, and 
Arab, countries on how to approach future interventions, and that he thinks that what 
happened in relation to the intervention in Libya was not the correct way to handle it. 
The process of internalization creates a dilemma for member states of the UNSC, and 
in this case Russia was caught in between the possibility to veto, and the possibility to 
“obey”. As mentioned previously it is only natural that member states have different 
perceptions in an international community (Hurd, 2007: 31), but it does create 
challenges for the given country when trying to defend their beliefs.  With that stated, 
it is important to notice that Lavrov also thought and wanted a brighter future for the 
Libyan people, he did to some extent want an intervention. “When we expressed our 
evaluations, we never questioned and are not questioning the right of the Libyan 
people for a better future.”(The Embassy of the Russian Federation in Canada, 2011).   
With business in the Middle East, both the US and Russia have different approaches 
to what should be done. Even if they share a common belief on how to help humanity 
against genocide and other crimes committed against humanity, but when it comes to 
the execution of the actions, the two nations vary greatly in their methods, and 
perception of rightful intervention. The US showed their positive interest in the no-fly 
zone, and argued that it was the correct decision to intervene with a no-fly zone. One 
of the reasons for Russia to abstain from voting, was the moral aspect of the situation, 
as we have enlighten in the previous section. Like the US they thought  it was an 
important issue, but they focused more on the business aspect, as it was the right 
decision for the US due to the capital they have invested in the stability in Libya, 
whereas Russia was worried about their oil interest and business interests in Libya 
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(The Embassy of the Russian Federation in Canada, 2011). They were concerned that 
a resolution including a no-fly zone, could have consequences for their business if a 
new regime was a result of the intervention (The Economist, 2015). 
Prime Minister Sergey Lavrov of Russia argued, that the Russian agreements with 
Libya about maintaining their oil contract, would be intact even if the regime changed 
from Gaddafi to NTC. This was not the case, due to the new Libyan government 
made an annulment of $10 billion oil contracts made by the former Gaddafi regime, 
these oil contracts now belong to European companies instead (The Economist, 
2015). The Russian concerns about the intervention was confirmed, as it affected their 
relationship with Libya and their loss of capital, by losing their oil contract and a 
valuable business partner. It can then be argued that their concern was definitely 
affected by self-interest, as the Russian have lost a lot of capital as a result of the 
intervention, and they would prevent that exact same thing to happen (The Embassy 
of the Russian Federation in Canada, 2011).   
The loss of allies in the Middle East also has the effect that the access to the region 
and the influence that Russia previously had, has now shrunken down to almost non. 
As mentioned before, Russia and Gaddafi had business relations, so naturally Russia 
wants to go the diplomatic route with negotiations to avoid any kind of humanitarian 
intervention with military action involved. This self-interest differs from the self-
interest of the US, as their interest in maintaining stability in the Middle East. Due to 
the fact that they have a history of being of two different perceptions of what is 
legitimate, a change in the Libyan government would therefore not influence the US 
as much as a humanitarian disaster in the country would. This supports our previous 
argument for the two different aspects of self-interest, and how these have influenced 
their view on how to vote regarding the intervention in Libya.  
This suggests that even though Russia had major issues with the form of military 
intervention that the UNSC had made, they simply obeyed among others, since the 
fear of being punished by other states, created a sense of urgency. As a weaker agent, 
compared to the UNSC as a whole, the power conditions were asymmetric, and 
resulted in being coerced into changing their behaviour, due to the fact that it would 
ultimately be beneficial for Russia and be in Russia’s best self-interest (Hurd, 2007: 
38). 
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In many years prior to the intervention, there have been tension between the US and 
Libya. One of the reasons, was that the Libyan government was against the US’ 
military and financial support in Israel, and the different interventions in the affairs of 
Arab states. (Blanchard & Zanotti, 2011: 7). The US are known to be a close allied to 
Israel, and every time there had been questions about the conflict between Israel and 
Palestine, the US always used their veto rights in the UNSC, where they since 2001 
have used it 10 times. (Research.un.org, 2015). The Libyan regime is one the other 
hand supporting a one-state solution, and they condemned Israel for their actions 
against Palestine. Besides supporting Palestine, the Libyan regime also have a history 
of supporting international terrorism and creation of mass-destruction weapons 
(Blanchard & Zanotti, 2011: 6-7). Another issue between the US and Libya, has been 
that Gaddafi thought it was accepted for terrorist groups to support parties, whereas 
the US was very much against this and accused the Libyan government for supporting 
terrorism (Blanchard & Zanotti, 2011: 6). These differences led to imposing 
economic, and diplomatic, sanctions against Libya by the US (Blanchard & Zanotti, 
2011: 7-8). The relationship between the two states started to change after 9/11, where 
Gaddafi publicly condemned the terrorist attacks and described them as “horrific and 
gruesome” and then seeked to improve the relationship with the US, by improving the 
counterterrorism cooperation and intelligence sharing (Blanchard & Zanotti, 2011: 
15).The previous mentioned sanctions were later removed, which led to businesses of 
the US being able to resume at trading with the businesses of Libya again (Blanchard 
& Zanotti, 2011: 7-8). This shows that even though Libya was a threat against the US 
interest, for a period of time, they started to form a new relationship. This was seen in 
how both the Bush and the Obama Administration requested fundings for programs 
relating to Libya. With the rediscovered interest for the energy and oil market in 
Libya, it was understandable in a sense that the US are inclined to be supportive of an 
intervention in Libya. It is essential for the US to create a more reliable market, and to 
make sure that the financial capital that was at stake for US stays intact. A 
humanitarian intervention in Libya would be something positive, therefore it is in the 
self-interest of the US. Before an action can be legitimate one have to either share the 
belief or see the benefits of having the same belief (Hurd, 2007: 30). In this case it 
would be both, as the US have signed the Charter and agree on how R2P should be 
used, but it would also be in their self- interest. With the new relationship, both the 
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Bush and Obama Administrations requested foundings to support the Libyan security 
forces and capabilities in border control, counter-terrorism, and import/export 
monitoring. The Obama Administration requested $350,000 in funding Libyan 
security forces with military education and training, which is also called International 
Military Education and Training (IMET). In addition there were also request for 
funding $250,000 in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and $275,000 in 
Nonproliferation Antiterrorism, Demining, And Related Programs (NADR). This is a 
total of $875,000 (Blanchard & Zanotti, 2011: 14). The investments in Libya supports 
the reason for an intervention, as the US could risk losing money without any.The fact 
that the US tried to invest money in Libyan military training, military financing and 
antiterrorism programs, shows that the US has an interest to improve the security and 
stability in the region, and the fact that Libya in 2006 was removed from the US’ 
black list of states supporting terrorism, shows that the relationship between the US 
and Libya was getting better before the intervention occurred (Blanchard & Zanotti, 
2011: Summary). 
This could result in a more preferably opportunity for China to show the support of 
the international community, if they did not use their right to veto in the matter of the 
intervention in Libya. Furthermore, if they voted in favor it could have influence on 
their business relations in Libya, which in the self-interest of China would not be the 
optimal situation. In an internalized process, it occurs that actors do change their own 
self-interest to obey the social structure (Hurd, 2007: 37). In this situation China have 
chosen to abstain and in that way they obey to the international community and they 
please their self-interest. 
The Chinese government was at that point involved in projects worth more than $18 
billion when the conflict broke out, mostly in construction, which might be 
destabilized due to an unfavourable side gaining power(The Economist, 2011). 
Libyan oil last year accounted for just 3% of China's imports, but Chinese oil 
companies has high interests in getting a bigger share of the Libyan oil production, 
considering the expanding chinese middle class and the increasing demand for oil in 
China (The Economist, 2011). Due to the fact, that it would have a large influence on 
the economy of China, which was not in the interest of China. This supports the 
argument to why they did not vote in favor for the intervention as well, as they risked 
a lot of money if the result of the intervention would influence their business interests. 
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A different approach from Russia’s, where Gaddafi was their allied and main reason 
for not intervening, was the Chinese approach, where the actual business, rather than 
the regime, was more important. Furthermore another challenge for China was that 
they had to ensure the safety of more than 35,000 Chinese workers in Libya (The 
Economist, 2011). 
Additionally, Clinton stated the President of the US would not be able to defend 
another crisis, as the one in Rwanda. With this statement she clearly saw a reason for 
intervening, as it would prevent the situation in Libya to become similar to the 
situation in Rwanda. It would therefore be for the best and the self-interest of Obama, 
to actually intervene and support the intervention (York, 2011). 
In the beginning of the discussion of the intervention in Libya, the Russian 
representative decided not to veto Resolution 1973 for two reasons. To begin with, 
they did not want to alienate themselves from Western leaders, who were pushing for 
the intervention. This rationalization shows how internalization occurs, as it changes 
the interest of Russia due to the pressure from the UNSC and the allies of the Western 
World. The Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov states, “I think there is an 
increasingly firm understanding that the United Nations is the load bearing pillar of a 
modern system of international relations. The UN has a unique legitimacy and 
universal powers, which let it develop mechanisms to provide an adequate response to 
emerging threats and challenges. And the key is the rule of law, which must be 
professed, not only within each state, as our Western powers have been exhorting us 
to do all along and with which we absolutely agree – but also in the international 
arena.” (The Embassy of the Russian Federation in Canada, 2011) With this statement 
he explains the importance of the UN in an international community. Furthermore, 
Russia see the UN and the UNSC to have great power in the international community 
and have the capacity to make the system work.  
To sum up, all of the three states had various self-interests in relation to the 
intervention in Libya. Because of this, these countries pursued different avenues and 
had distinct views on what kind of intervention was needed.   
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Conclusion	
 
The international community is a complicated matter to write about in various ways. 
Several complicated factors affect how the different actors behave within this 
community. Our project revolves around the perception of legitimacy, by different 
states, and therefore our research question is “Did the United States of America, 
China and Russia share the same views on the legitimacy of the humanitarian 
intervention in Libya authorized by the Security Council of the United Nations?” 
With this research question we have chosen to use Ian Hurd’s definition of 
legitimacy, in order to get an understanding on the different states behaviour within 
the international community, hereby specifically the UNSC. With Hurd’s theory we 
had to look at internalization, self-interest, symbolic value and more importantly how 
these factors influence the perception of legitimacy and the legitimacy of the UN and 
the UNSC.  
 
It can be concluded, that the UNSC is dependent on the perception of legitimacy, by 
different social actors. Their perception can be seen through actions and statements of 
the states within the international community. Furthermore, these actor’s perception is 
also depending on how the UNSC is acting in the international community. We 
conclude that before something can be seen as legitimate, the actors in the 
international community has to share the same belief upon what is ‘right’. The 
different beliefs amongst the actors within the international community result in 
different self-interest, and therefore different foreign policy. With this self-interest, 
there is a high potential for the actor within the international community to change 
their perception of legitimacy. 
As shown in this project, the US, Russia and China have diverse perceptions and 
understandings of what legitimacy is, which is showcased by the nature of their 
actions. 
This is evident, when one looks at how the US shows their perception of legitimacy 
regarding their support of the intervention in Libya. The support by the US can be 
seen when they release statements to legitimize the intervention, due to the war 
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crimes committed against civilians in Libya.  Clinton stated that the US could not 
afford to have another tragedy similar to the one that happened in Rwanda, and as a 
result they legitimized the military intervention in Libya. Furthermore, they felt that 
there was a need to support their allies in NATO, who supported the US during the 
war in Iraq. 
By the process of internalization, the US acknowledges the common belief that it is 
morally ‘right’ to stop the killings of civilians, so the US will follow this common 
belief and legitimize the UNSC by taking action. This was supported by Obama’s 
statement, where he alluded to the fact that the actions by Gaddafi, was not legitimate 
and therefore immediate action had to be taken and this should be done, if necessary, 
by military force. Thereby we can then conclude that the perception of legitimacy by 
the US is both affected by the internalization in the UNSC, but also by their own self-
interest. 
The understanding of legitimacy by the Russian government varies compared to the 
one we see in the US. Russia agreed that action was necessary, but they did not agree 
upon the notion that actions had to include military forces. They rather preferred to 
start with diplomatic negotiations before military action was taken. The reason why 
Russia abstained during the meeting, regarding Libya, was due to the economic 
interest that Russia had in Libya. In statements from Sergey Lavror, the Foreign 
Minister of Russia, it was clearly stated that he thought a better way to solve the 
situation in Libya would have been done with negotiations. Furthermore, Russia had 
business in Libya, which could have been threatened if they voted in favour of the 
intervention, but a veto would have had consequences for Russia in the international 
community, as there was, and still is, a shared belief on what is ‘right’. We conclude 
that this shared belief had a huge influence on the decision about the intervention in 
relation to Russia, but that their self-interest was an important factor for the abstaining 
from voting as well. This is an important factor of the perception of legitimacy that 
Russia has. They did not see the intervention, as being legitimate, yet they preferred 
not to use their right to veto, due to the internalization in the international community. 
Furthermore, Russia does, in general, see the UN and the UNSC as being legitimate, 
due to the fact that they do not see how an international community, or system, would 
be able to exist, if it was not for the power the UN and UNSC have. 
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Our third actor in the project is China, who we can conclude share some of the same 
perception as Russia, due to how the intervention should have happened. Thus Russia 
and China are different in many ways, when it comes to foreign policy, they are both 
very traditional regarding solving international issues, whereas military force should 
be the very last option. China stated that the intervention had raised a lot of question 
regarding the UNSC, e.g if the way the situation in Libya would become the universal 
model of solving issues regarding humanitarian intervention. This was a concern that 
was not answered. Furthermore, China did support the intervention to the extent that a 
solution was needed in Libya, and due to previously questions about China’s business 
in Libya, they abstained from the voting, as they did not want to raise any more 
questions about whether or nor China was fully supportive of the international 
community. This symbolic value had a huge influence, as well as their self-interest, 
due to both their business in Libya as well as the Chinese citizens in Libya. 
  
We can conclude that, in the international community it is important to be aware of 
the internalization that occurs. This internalization gathers the states to have the same 
shared belief of what is morally ‘right’ and what is ‘wrong’. Furthermore, we can 
conclude that this shared belief can also be used as a tool, to pursue their self-interest. 
We can conclude from our analysis that the shared belief of the states was to prevent 
further casualties to occur in Libya. With this common belief it does not necessarily 
mean they have the same perception of what constitutes as legitimate, this difference 
in the perceptions will always occur in an internalized international community.    
Afterthoughts		
 
By using Ian Hurd’s theory, we found answers to what the states recognize as 
legitimate, and further how this changed with the way the intervention in Libya was 
handled. In our literature review, we have explored different theories and ways to 
conduct an analysis similar to ours, but also with a different approach from the one 
that we chose. Regarding this, we looked at how other projects have analyzed 
statements from official states representatives. One of the projects decoded both 
speeches and statements by looking at what they saw as biased (positive or negative) 
language that was used. If we implemented the same kind of method, it could have 
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given us a more specific answer, and maybe also different answers, as we would not 
only analyze the exact statements, but also analyze what the actors thought about the 
UN and UNSC’s overall legitimacy. With this method they concluded that there are 
more negative words than positive words in the speeches and statements, in relation to 
the UNSC. Furthermore, the UNSC are not ‘afraid’ that this would change anything. 
With this conclusion, it could have been even more essential to analyze the power that 
UNSC has, including the fact that no one questions this power, or if the UNSC is 
actually exceeding the mandate it possesses by rule of the UN Charter. Even if states 
have an opinion about the actions being legitimate or not, it does not lead to 
consequences for the UNSC. Additionally the second project in our literature review 
focused on whether or not the UNSC exceed their mandate, and how it happened. 
Even if the UNSC exceed the mandate, it had no influence, because no one had the 
authority to questioning or judging the UNSC. With the use of Hurd’s theory, it could 
be analyzed, by focusing even more on the concept of internalization, and how this 
have an influence on the states that are not questioning the UNSC, to the extent where 
it can have consequences. This can also be a result of what was before the UN, and 
the UNSC, which was a World affected by war (the 2. World War), and as a result of 
this, member states are afraid of creating a World with no common sense or belief,. 
As we have analyzed, the view and the permanent states, we have also seen how 
internalization have an influence on the budget donations and participation by the 
member states. Another aspect could be to see if the states that are a part of the UN 
and the UNSC, are influenced by what they gain from the UN, rather than the shared 
belief. Some of the beliefs might have just appeared after being a part of the UN or 
have appeared during the process of being a part of the UN, since these states need to 
conform to the structure of the UN. 
It could also be interesting to focus on the citizens’ perception of legitimacy in the 
states we are working with. By having this focus it could be examined if the citizens 
support their government, but also how the citizens influence the government. 
Furthermore, a focus could be on the education, age, gender and location of the 
citizens and their opinions, to see if that have any influence on the thoughts of the 
UNSC and the interventions done by implementing R2P. To approach this angle a 
need for surveys and statistics would appear, and these factors would help analyzing 
the answers of the citizens. Furthermore, with this approach it would be relevant to 
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use Bourdieu’s theory about habitus and social structure as well as Weber’s class 
struggle. These sociologists could have given an answer to how the citizens view the 
World, and how this view can affect the government within the states. 
A more political view would have been to use the International Relation theory, 
which would have explained the politics in an international World and how the states 
in the UNSC are acting because, of their foreign politics and in accordance to the 
international community. With this theory it would have been interesting to use the OI 
theory as well, as it examines how the organization, herein the UN behaves in the 
international community. Also have the organization changes the view and perception 
of the World to respond to the demands of the states within the organization. With an 
OI theory we could have looked at the three factors it highlights, which is the central, 
enduring, and distinctive features of the organization.  
Delimitations	
Although we only focused on one definition of legitimacy, we are aware that other 
definitions could have been used as well. We also could have focused on the member 
states’ participation in the UN, from the economical one, to the participation in actual 
peacekeeping missions. This is very relevant, as the economy has an influence on how 
much the states are able to participate, e.g. with militaries forces. Within this aspect, it 
could also be interesting to see if it has any influence on how the five permanent 
states are chosen, if the national economy have influence on an international level. 
Nonetheless, with a more thorough economic approach it could be examined how the 
five permanent states’ use of veto is influenced by their economic interest.  
Another delimitation is that we have not looked at the decisions and statements from a 
historical perspective. We have analyzed the statements from an interest view and as a 
result of internalization, but not how the countries have different historical factors that 
could influence their statements. 
We have not included any geographic aspects, because our focus have been on how 
the member states view legitimacy, independent from where in the World they are 
placed. 
In regards to our approach to legitimacy and our project, we have not looked at if the 
actions in the UNSC are legal, but only if the three states believed they was 
legitimate. We have therefore not included any laws or paragraph to answer the 
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specific actions within the UNSC. Also, we could have looked at how, and what, non-
UNSC member states perceive as legitimate. A different approach could have been to 
look at other actors, such as external ones. These could have been other types of 
actors, such as NGO’s like Red Cross or Amnesty International. To provide a broader 
aspect, we could have looked at institutions like the World Bank or The International 
Monetary Foundation, and we could also have made an analysis about sovereignty, 
including the different kinds, and how states perceive it.  
The Journal Article ”R2P–Principle and Practice? The UNSC on Libya” authored by 
Daniel Silander examines the political scene regarding the Mummar Gaddafi led 
regime in Libya, and what happened during the civil war. Its analysis focuses on 
“Resolution 1970” and “Resolution 1973” that were implemented by the UNSC and 
carried out by NATO (Silander, 2013). The overall argument is based around the 
notion “that although R2P has been proclaimed to be a core principle for human 
security, the Libyan crisis shows much discrepancy and confusion by the international 
community regarding how that principle should be applied”.  
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